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Foreword 
A significant part of the world population lives in flood-prone areas. Particularly, the 
Netherlands are vulnerable to a rising sea level and increasing frequency of river 
flooding. About 60 to 70 percent of the country’s population and economic value is 
concentrated in areas that are at risk from flooding from the sea and/or rivers. The 
situation may be further worsen by climate change affecting in particular the see level 
rise and frequency and severity of weather-related catastrophic events. 
The report describes the results of on-going joint IIASA-DELTARES1 project on 
insurability of flood risks in outside dikes’ areas in Rijnmond-Drechtsteden (RD) region 
around Rotterdam, the Netherlands. In the studies, the integrated catastrophic risks 
management model of ESM (ICRM, www.iiasa.ac.at/researchPrograms/ESM/)  
combines a HIS-SSM model (Highwater Information System – Damage and Casualties 
Module) and stochastic quantile-based optimization procedures to generate scenarios of 
flood losses and quantify robust insurance policies for flood-prone locations outside 
main flood defense system, i.e. outside dike rings.  
The project develops approaches for designing robust “public-private” flood-loss 
sharing programs comprised, e.g., of private flood insurance, central and local 
governments, and financial instruments (contingent credits, cat bonds, etc.) for 
“buffering” the risks. Involvement of governments and introduction of financial 
instruments increases the demand for the insurance and helps fulfill its liabilities 
avoiding insolvency.  
The project enables exchange of practical and methodological experience between 
IIASA and DELTARES: IIASA develops novel methodologies and practical 
approaches for integrated catastrophic risks management, discounting, security and 
robust solutions (Systemic Risks, Security and Robust Solutions project, ASA), applied 
                                                 
1
 Deltares (http://www.deltares.nl/en ) is an independent institute for applied research with a unique 
combination of knowledge and experience in the field of water, subsurface and infrastructure. Deltares 
is frontrunner in the development and application of knowledge to meet the short- and long-term 
challenges in the physical planning and management of vulnerable deltas, coastal areas and river basins. 
The majority of its projects are interdisciplinary to address the multiple interests in management of 
water resources. Deltares plays a central role in the Dutch national climate adaptation programme – the 
Deltaprogramme – both in direct policy supportive research and associated scientific research 
programmes (e.g. Knowledge for Climate, Building with Nature, Flood Control)  
 v 
in case studies of catastrophic floods, wind storms, earthquakes, outbreaks of livestock 
related diseases, etc. DELTARES is involved in practical water management projects 
such as flood protection (Project for the development of a new test instrumentarium 
based on flood risk assessment); environment, e.g. water pollution treatment, taxation; 
etc. Joint research proposes new robust conclusions for policy makers. 
 
 vi 
Abstract 
As flood risks grow worldwide, a well-designed insurance engaging various 
stakeholders becomes a vital instrument in flood risk management. This paper focuses 
on the design of a multi-pillar flood-loss sharing program involving partial 
compensation to flood victims by the central government, the pooling of risks through a 
private insurance on the basis of location-specific exposures, and a contingent ex-ante 
credit to reinsure the liabilities. The analysis is guided by an integrated catastrophe risk 
management (ICRM) model consisting of GIS-based flood model and a stochastic 
optimization procedure with respect to location-specific risk exposures. To achieve the 
stability and robustness of the program towards floods with various recurrences, the 
ICRM uses stochastic optimization procedure, which relies on insolvency constraint and 
Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) indicators. Two alternative ways of calculating 
insurance premiums are compared: the robust derived with the ICRM and the traditional 
average annual loss approaches. The applicability of the ICRM model is illustrated on a 
case-study of a larger Rotterdam area outside main flood protection system in the 
Netherlands. Our numerical experiments demonstrate essential advantages of the robust 
premiums, namely that they: (1) guarantee program’s solvency under all (or a 
percentile) flood scenarios rather than one average event; (2) establish a tradeoff 
between the security of the program and the welfare of locations; (3) decrease the need 
for other risk transfer and risk reduction measures. 
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1 Introduction 
A significant part of the world population lives in flood-prone coastal and delta areas. 
About 23 percent of the world population residing coastal zone and 10 percent of the 
population living in low-lying areas [39] are threatened by floods. For example, 
damages from coastal storms and floods in the USA in 2012 accounted for almost 
$54 billion of estimated overall losses [40].  
Particularly, the Netherlands are vulnerable to a rising sea level and an increasing 
frequency of river flooding. About 60 to 70 percent of the country’s population and 
economic value is concentrated in areas that are at risk from flooding from the sea 
and/or rivers. The situation may be further threatened by climate change affecting in 
particular the see level rise. Coastal and delta areas were historically developed due to 
their proximity to marine and river transportation. Further developments are attracted to 
historic centers by agglomeration forces as well as by rich environmental amenities. As 
a result exposure and vulnerability in coastal areas rapidly increase due to the clustering 
of population and growth of property values in flood-prone areas [26]. As a matter of 
fact, urban developments are capital intensive and are highly path-dependent [9], which 
means that where and how much of coastal and riverfront properties get developed 
depends on the series of previous decisions, e.g. location of past developments and past 
flood risk management (FRM) policy. A significant time lag between FRM decision and 
actual risk reduction demands a long-term vision and a comprehensive approach 
accounting for feedbacks and externalities [14], [22]. 
Worldwide governments develop FRM policies that aim to reduce flood risk. It can be 
reduced by decreasing either probabilities of the hazard, i.e. through structural 
engineering solutions such as dikes or beach nourishments, or the damages, i.e. through 
zoning, financial measures to distribute risk across stakeholders, or flood-proofing 
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buildings. Flood safety is often assured by structural flood defense measures, spatial 
planning, subsidized flood insurance or disaster relief programs. These measures are 
mostly funded by governments, i.e. society as a whole independently of the benefits the 
individuals in particular locations receive from a certain FRM measure. This 
unintentionally impedes any incentives for local stakeholders (households, business, 
local jurisdictions) to take measures to make flood-resilient choices reducing overall 
flood damage at macro-level [6], [33], [46]. In the USA, public investments in 
infrastructure and levees in coastal areas led to rapid population growth and consequent 
growth of flood risk [4].  
In the Netherlands, the Delta works and flood defenses provided the highest safety 
standards in the world while, simultaneously, the population and economic activities in 
hazard zones increased at a speed never observed before [26]. It is recognized that 
governments should engage stakeholders to assure effective FRM policy [13], which 
avoids mounting costs for, firstly, subsidizing developments in flood-prone areas, and 
then compensating damages. Thus, there need to be economic stimuli to encourage 
individuals in making flood-resilient choices and incorporate long-term societal needs, 
such as curbing flood risks, into short-term oriented local decisions today. 
Flood insurance is considered a vital element of FRM policy [38]. A well-designed 
flood insurance program: (i) spreads the risk across actors, locations and time and 
assures funds available for loss compensation [35], (ii) increases public awareness of 
flood risks [36], (iii) often leads to price discounts which reflect capitalized risks [7], 
(iv) promotes damage mitigation measures [8], and (v) improves land use efficiency 
[43]. Such a public-private partnership (PPP) may assume, for example, a financial 
layer of contributions from property owners (households and businesses), a layer of 
private insurance, a risk transfer layer through reinsurance or/and catastrophe bonds, 
and finally a layer of government contribution in a form of a cap or reinsurances of 
extreme losses. This collective effort involving multiple stakeholders requires the 
analysis of their mutually dependent risk exposures. For example, if an insurer wants to 
decrease the chances of bankruptcy which may happen if he faces a loss greater than a 
certain level, he may decrease the chances by imposing higher premiums or decreasing 
coverage, take reinsurance or buy a catastrophe bond. The burden of losses is shifted 
away from the insurer but may be unevenly redistributed among other stakeholders, i.e., 
individuals, government, reinsurance companies, and lead to their instability or ruin. 
Thus, the success of a loss-sharing program depends on the mutual stability of the 
involved heterogeneous stakeholders. This requires the analysis of complex multivariate 
joint probability distributions of losses dependent on the frequency and intensity of 
hazards leading to the development of region-specific catastrophe flood models. 
Traditional catastrophe models comprise several modules: a hazard generator, 
vulnerability and financial modules. Catastrophe models of today are very 
comprehensive. Open source and proprietary catastrophe models (e.g. developed by 
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AIR, RMS, EQECAT) use rich spatial data and estimate premiums based not only on 
historically observed risks but also considering various socio-economic and climatic 
scenarios [1], [23], [25]. However, in many of these models the pricing of catastrophe 
risk is based on the Average Annual Loss (AAL) without explicit accounting for goals 
and constraints of the involved stakeholders. A risk load is often expressed in terms of 
standard deviation) and administrative costs load [34], or only on AAL [1]. Due to the 
skewedness of catastrophe risks as well as spatio-temporal dependencies of losses on 
past and current policies, this approach may appear misleading [2], [5].  
In contrast, the quantile-based, in particular, Value-at-Risk (VaR, [42], [47]) indicators, 
gain popularity for determining catastrophic insurance policies [2], [41]. 
Geographically-detailed catastrophe models combined with quantile-based risk 
indicators and stochastic optimization procedures allow proper capturing of spatio-
temporal profiles of catastrophe risks and avoiding irreversible shocks to insurance 
arrangements and involved stakeholders [17], [18].  
In this paper, we focus on a quantile-based approach to estimate location specific risk-
based premiums outside dikes in the Rijnmond-Drechtsteden (RD) area around 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands. We apply an integrated catastrophe risk management 
(ICRM2) model combining a HIS-SSM model (Highwater Information System – 
Damage and Casualties Module, [31]) and a stochastic optimization procedure to 
generate scenarios of flood losses and quantify robust insurance policies for flood-prone 
locations outside main flood defense system, i.e. outside dike rings. Until recently 
insurance from river and coastal flooding did not exist in the Netherlands, leaving post-
disaster relief program as the only financial instrument in FRM. The issue has been 
debatable since some consider it unfeasible 30, 32 while others think it is feasible under 
various reinsurance schemes [1]. Yet, the first flood insurance contracts became 
available at the end of 2012 [3] but only for areas protected by dikes. Although several 
studies exist on how to enhance flood insurance system in the Netherlands [1], [27], 
[28], [30], [32], they primarily analyze inside-dikes flood risks. For example, Aerts and 
Botzen [1] apply AAL principle to derive flood-related insurance premiums for large 
dike-ring areas in the Netherlands.  
This paper studies the insurability of the flood risk in RD region from the view point of 
insurance supply and demand. The balance between supply and demand substantially 
depends on the choice of coverage and premiums: the choice of insurance coverage and 
premiums reflects the capacity of insurance to sustain the floods and the wiliness of 
                                                 
2
 Integrated Catastrophic Risk Management model (ICRM) has been developed at International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). For the description see e.g. Ermolieva, T., Ermoliev, Y., Norkin, 
V. 1997;  Ermolieva, T., Ermoliev, Y. 2012; Amendola, A., Ermolieva, et al. 2012 and further 
references therein.  
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individuals to pay the premiums. We use such economically sound risk indicators as 
expected overpayments by “individuals” and expected shortfall of the insurance to 
derive robust “fair” premiums and coverage to achieve the desirable probability of 
insurance default and balance the supply and demand. In the RD region, the ICRM is 
used for the design of a robust flood loss sharing program based on pooling risks 
through location-specific flood insurance, partial compensation to the flood victims by 
the central government, and a contingent credits to the insurance for “buffering” the 
risk. Involvement of the government and introduction of the contingent credit increases 
the demand for the insurance and helps fulfill its liabilities avoiding insolvency.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2.1 presents a stylized model of 
insurance business illustrating the shortcomings of the AAL approach to risk pricing 
and the need for the insolvency (quantile-based) constrains and the stochastic 
optimization for robust management of catastrophe risks. Section 2.2 outlines the 
methodology of the ICRM model extending the basic model of Section 2.1 to a multi-
agent spatially explicit and dynamic stochastic optimization model involving 
analytically-intractable multivariate joint loss distributions of the agents. Section 3 
describes the case study of a larger Rotterdam area and available modules and data. 
Section 4 reports the results of numerical experiments in terms of spatial distribution of 
insurance premiums and dynamics of the insurance fund reserves. It identifies the 
differences between the model-derived robust insurance premiums and coverage in 
comparison to actuarial approaches based on AAL. Conclusions are summarized in 
Section 5. 
2 Integrated Catastrophe Management Model 
2.1 A Stylized Model of Insurance Business 
In the Netherlands, flood safety standards in the protected areas vary between 200 to 
and 10,000 -year floods return periods [29]. In the areas outside the main protection 
system flood return periods may occur starting from once every 10 years. Although 
floods may happen rarely, their abrupt occurrence in time and space comes as “spikes” 
that cannot be properly modeled on “average”. For example in Dordrecht, a flood with a 
return period of 2000 years causes damage of 1.5 billion euro. According to the AAL 
approach an expected damage is 750,000 euro per year including damage to private 
(households and businesses) and governmental actors. This is a reasonable affordable 
amount except that this damage is not going to occur in small annual portions – all 1.5 
billion will come at once. Thus, annualization of expected damages and estimation of 
insurance premiums based on that average may be misleading and could undermine the 
financial stability of an insurance program and overall risk management policy. 
Treatment of catastrophic damages requires quantile-based stochastic optimization 
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approaches. In what follows we illustrate this with a simple model that addresses the 
“abruptness” feature of catastrophes. In Section 2.2 this model is generalized to a 
framework involving goals and constraints of multiple agents and in Section 3.2.5 
presents numerical experiments to test the model using data from the RD case study 
region.  
Consider a simple stylized model of insurance business (see, e.g [10], [24]).  Financial 
stability of the insurer is characterized by the dynamics of his risk reserve accumulation, 
i.e., the capital he has at the disposal to pay out claims. In the simplest case the risk 
reserve  at time  is defined as , , where  and  are 
aggregated premiums and claims correspondingly, and  is the initial risk reserve. The 
process ∑= = )(1tNk kt SA , where )(tN , 0≥t  denotes a random number of claims in 
interval ],0[ t  (e.g., a Poisson process) with 0)0( =N , and { }∞1kS  is a sequence of 
independent and identically distributed random variables (claims) ― in other words, 
replicates of a random variable S . In this model, the inflow of premiums tπ  pushes tr  
up, whereas the random outflow tA  pushes tr  down (Figure 1).  
The main problem of the insurer is to avoid the situation when tr  drops below the 
“vital” level (ruin) ― in our example, equal to 0. In insurance industry, the bankruptcy 
is allowed only with a certain insolvency probability { }0  ,  somefor  0 >≤=Ψ ttrP t  
(once in 1000 years,  1000/1=Ψ ).  
 
 
Figure 1: Trajectory (scenario) of the risk reserve  subject to the random process of claims. 
The stability of an insurer may be improved in many ways, e.g., by adjusting premiums. 
The deterministic or AAL approach to calculation of premiums is very simplified, as 
illustrated by the following calculations. Assume that )(tN , kS , are independent, )(tN  
has intensity σ , i.e., { } ttNE σ=)( , and tt π=π . Then the expected profit over the 
interval ],0[ t is calculated as a difference between the expected annual premiums and 
t
r t ttt Arr −π+= 0 0≥t tπ tA
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claims, i.e. ( )tSE σπ )(− . The expected profit increases in time if 0)( >− σπ SE . This 
model ignores complex interdependencies among the timing of claims (temporal 
clustering), their sizes, and the subsequent possibility of ruin, 0≤tr . In this 
formulation, complex random process tr  is replaced by a simplified linear one in t 
function, ( ) tESrr t  0 σπ −+= . The difference ESσπ −  is the “safety loading”. It 
follows from the strong law of large numbers that [ ] [ ]EStAtt σππ −→− /   with the 
probability of 1. Therefore, in the case of positive safety loading, ESσπ > , we have to 
expect random profit tt A−π  for a sufficiently large t  would also be positive under the 
appropriate choice of premium ESσρπ )1( += , where ρ  is the “relative safety” 
loading ESES σσπρ /)( −= . However, this holds only if ruin does not occur before 
time t . As illustrated in Figure 2, despite that the growth of risk reserves tr  is 
guaranteed on average, the ruin of the real growth process tr  may occur. In other 
words, the substitution of the complex jumping process tr  by a simple deterministic 
model forecasting gradual growth of the reserve may lead to unforeseen collapses. Only 
a stochastic model is able to estimate the demand for such financial risk management 
measures as risk-based flood insurance, borrowing, contingent credits, or governmental 
bonds. It is also possible to reduce the severity of the distribution of claims by various 
loss reduction mitigation measures. However, all this is possible only by analyzing the 
probability of ruin Ψ . The claim size S  depends on the coverage of the insurer 
operating on geographically distinct locations. In general, various decision variables 
affect Ψ . Important decision variables are 0r , π ,  and reinsurance arrangements. The 
reduction of Ψ  to acceptable levels can be viewed as the so-called chance constraint 
stochastic optimization problem (see 16). The complexity is associated with the random 
jumping process tA  (claims), with analytically intractable dependencies of tA on 
decision variables, which requires specific quantile-based stochastic optimization 
methods. Stochastic optimization produces decisions, which fulfill the constraint Ψ  
with guaranteed probability, i.e., the decisions are robust with respect to desired 
proportion (percentile) of all flood events. Throughout the paper we use the term 
“robust” to define such an insurance program that: 1) fulfills goals and constraints of the 
involved stakeholders; 2) remains solvent under all (or a percentile) flood scenarios 
rather than one (average) event.  
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Figure 2: Expected and real growth of the risk reserve. There is an exit scenario due to an 
extreme event at time , which depletes the safety loading. 
2.2 Stochastic Integrated Catastrophe Risk Management Model  
Previous section briefly outlined some methodological complexities related to 
catastrophe management. Now we introduce a general integrated catastrophe risk 
management model (ICRM) developed at IIASA [17], [19], [21]. To account for 
multiple risk management stakeholders, the insurance model of section 2.1 is  modified 
as follows. The study region is subdivided into sub-regions or locations mj ,...,2,1= . 
Locations may correspond to a collection of households, flood-protection zone, 
municipality, etc. For example in [1] the locations correspond to dike-protected areas. 
We assume that for each location j  an estimation jW  of the property value or “wealth” 
of this location exists, which includes values of houses, lands, factories, etc.  
Suppose that n  agents, ni ,...,1= , (insurers, governments, re-insurers) are involved in 
the loss sharing program. They may have contracts with locations to cover their losses. 
Each agent i  has an initial fund or a risk reserve 0iR  (similar to the model in section 2) 
that in general depends on magnitudes of catastrophic events, as it is illustrated with 
numerical experiments in Section 3. Assume that the planning horizon covers 
1...,1,0 −= Tt  time intervals. The risk reserve tiR  at each t  is calculated according to 
the following formula: [ ] ∑∑ ∈=+ −−+= )(11 )()()( ttj tijttjmj ttijttijtiti qLqcqRR ωε ωπ ,      (1) 
where ni ,...,2,1= , { }mjniqq tijt ,1,,1  , === , tijq  is the coverage of a company i  in 
location j  at time t , 1
1
≤∑ =ni tijq , )( ttij qπ  is the premium from contracts characterized 
by coverage { }tijq  (full coverage of losses corresponds to 1=tijq ), and )( ttij qc  are 
t
t
r
0r
t
t
t
A
r
r
−π+= 0 ( )tESrrt 0 α−π+=
τ
τ
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transaction costs or administrative, running or other costs. )( ttjL ω  is the loss (damage) 
in location j  caused by a catastrophe tω  at time t . Random catastrophic events 
),...,( 10 −= Tωωω  may affect a random number of different locations. In general, a 
catastrophic event at time t is modeled by a random subset )(ωε t  of locations j  and its 
magnitude in each j . The losses )( ttjL ω  depend on the event tω , mitigation measures 
(e.g., dikes against flooding), and vulnerability of property values in j .  
Variables tijq  and )( ttij qπ  allow the characterization of the differences in risks at 
different locations. It is assumed that all agents may cover different fractions of 
catastrophic losses from the same location. Variables tijq  interconnect the processes of 
t
iR , ni ,...,2,1=  (e.g., )( ttij qπ , )( ttij qc , tijtj qL ) with each other. Inflows of premiums 
push trajectories of tiR  up, whereas claims and transactions costs push them down.  
In the case of a catastrophe, a location j  faces losses (damages) tjL . Individuals at this 
location receive compensation tij
t
j qL  from company i  when such a loss occurs, and pay 
insurance premiums )( ttij qπ . If 0jW  is the initial wealth (property value), then the 
location’s j  wealth at time 1+t  equals: ∑=+ −−+= ni tjttijtijtjtjtj LqqLWW 11 ))(( π , ,...1,0=t .     (2) 
Equations (1) and (2) represent rather general processes of accumulation. Let us denote 
the decision variable by a vector x , which includes components of coverage q  and 
feasible mitigation measures. For each insurer (agent) i  consider a stopping time iτ for 
process ),( ωxR ti , i.e., a random variable with integer values Tt ,0= . The event { }ti =τω :  with fixed t  corresponds to the decision to stop process ),( ωxW ti  after time 
t . Examples of iτ  may be the time of the ruin before a given time T :[ ]{ }0,0),(:min,min),( ><= txRtTx tii ωωτ  (in which case iτ  is a rather complex 
implicit function of x ) or the time of the first catastrophe, τ=t .  
Assume that each agent, i , and location, j , maximize their “wealth” at τ=t , i.e., they 
are concerned with the resilience against possible catastrophes. In general, the notion of 
wealth at t  requires an exact definition, as it must represent in a sense the whole 
probability distribution of τiR , τiW . The performance of insurance depends on whether 
the accumulated fund [ ]∑ ∑= =  −τ π1 1 )()(t mj ttijttij qcq  is able to cover claims ∑∈ )( )(τωτ τττε ωj ijj qL . 
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Thus, insurers will maximize their wealth, which depends on the (random) balance of 
income and payments: [ ] ∑∑ ∑ ∈= = − −= )(1 1 )()()( τωτ τττττ ε ωπϑ j ijjt mj ttijttiji qLqcq . 
The stability of an insurer is determined by the probability of the event  { }01 <= τϑiE .          (3) 
Individuals (locations) maximize their wealth, which depends on whether the amount of 
premiums that they pay to the insurer does not exceed the compensation of losses at 
time τ=t : 
ττττ ττ ωπ ijj
t
k
ijj qLqv )()(
0
−=∑= . 
Therefore, the “financial” stability of locations depends on the probability of the event { }02 <= τν iE .         (4) 
Inequalities (3)–(4) define important events, constraining the choice of decision 
variables, e.g., insurance premiums, coverage. The probability of events (3)–(4), i.e., 
underpayments to insurers and overpayments by individuals, determine the stability 
(resilience) of the scheme. This can be expressed in terms of the probabilistic constraint [ ] pEEP ≤21 , ,         (5) 
where p  is a desirable probability threshold of the program’s failure (default) that 
occurs, say, only once in 100 years. Constraint (5) is similar to an insolvency constraint, 
a standard for regulations of the insurance business. In stochastic optimization 16, it is 
known as the so-called chance constraint. Note, however, that this constraint does not 
account for the attained values of 1E  and 2E . The main goal in setting up the insurance 
scheme can now be formulated as the minimization of expected total losses ∑ −=
ij
jij LqExF
τ)1()(   
including uncovered (uninsured) losses by the insurance scheme subject to chance 
constraint (5), where vector x , in the most simple example, consists of the components 
ijπ  and ijq . There are important connections between the minimization of )(xF  subject 
to highly non-linear and possibly discontinuous chance constraints (5) and the 
minimization of convex functions, which have important economic interpretations. 
Consider the following function: 
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{ } { }ττ νϑα j
ji
i EβExFxG ,0max ,0max)()( ∑∑ ++=      (6) 
where βα ,  are positive parameters. It is possible to prove (see general results in 20 that 
for large enough βα ,  the minimization of function )(xG  generates solutions x  with 
)(xF  approaching the minimum of )(xF  subject to (5) for any given level p .  
The minimization of )(xG , as defined by (6), has a simple economic interpretation. 
Function )(xF  comprises expected direct losses associated with the insurance program. 
The second term quantifies the expected shortfall of the program to fulfill its 
obligations; it can be viewed as the expected amount of ex-post borrowing with a fee α  
needed for this purpose. Similarly, the third term can be interpreted as the expected ex-
post borrowing with a fee β  needed to compensate overpayments. Obviously, large 
enough fees α , β  will tend to preclude the violation of (3)–(4). Thus, ex-post 
borrowing with large enough fees allows for a control of the insolvency constraints (5).  
Functions (6) is nonsmooth due to the presence of max operations. In (6), nonsmooth 
risk functions are used to guarantee a trade-off between profits and risks of 
underestimating losses and overestimating profits with substitution coefficients α  and β 3.   
In the following section we adjust the model for the analysis of an insurance program 
for the areas outside the main protections system close to Rotterdam. The ICRM is used 
for the design of a robust flood loss sharing program based on pooling risks through 
location-specific flood insurance, partial compensation to the flood victims by the 
central government, and a contingent credit to the insurance for “buffering” the risk. 
3 Case Study and the Revised Model 
3.1 Case study region 
The case-study covers the area outside dike rings in the RD region including Rotterdam 
(Figure 3.a). Though many studies exist on how to enhance flood insurance system [1], 
[27], [28], [30], [32] in the Netherlands, they analyze primarily inside-dikes flood risks 
and consequent insurance premiums. This paper focuses on flood risks in the areas 
outside the main protections system and quantifies an example of a robust flood-loss 
sharing insurance program.  
The RD region is prone to both river and coastal flooding. The areas outside dike rings 
(Figure 3.b) differ from the areas inside the main protections system in terms of 
                                                 
3
 Minimization of total expected losses under explicit “insolvency” constraints leads to a general 
nonsmooth stochastic optimization problem. 
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physical aspects of flood risk and responsibilities among stakeholders in a number of 
ways (Table 1). Most important is that currently flood protection within the dike rings is 
fully in the responsibility of the government, while for the outside dike ring areas there 
are no safety standards guaranteed by the government. New investments are at the risk 
of individuals, with no governmental compensation provided in the case of a hazard 
event. The Netherlands did not have insurance from river or coastal flooding until 
recently, what makes it difficult especially for the areas outside the main protections 
system to: (i) communicate risks, (ii) to take individual action to distribute losses in 
time, and (iii) to create stimuli for damage mitigation actions such as additional flood-
proofing of houses.  
 
Table 1: Physical aspects of flood risks and responsibilities among stakeholders in the areas 
outside dike rings in comparison with the protected ones. 
Areas outside the main protections system Protected areas within a dike-ring 
Flood and damage characteristics 
Government does not guarantee any safety standards. 
Actual return periods vary between 1:5, 1:10 years to  
1:100, 1:1000 years or less frequent (e.g. 1:10000 for 
new harbor areas) 
Safety standards assigned by law:  
1:200 to 1:1250 years – river floods 
1:2000 and 1/4000 for the estuary (tidal rivers) 
1:4000- to 1-10.000 years – coastal floods. 
Probability of flood is location-specific and may be 
much higher than the official safety standard in the 
neighboring protected areas. 
One homogeneous safety standard for the whole 
dike-ring. 
Properties are elevated above sea level, i.e. on dunes, 
man-made high elevation grounds, etc. 
Many developments inside dike rings are below 
sea level (up to -6 meters). 
Flood water comes with low velocity and goes away 
quickly. 
Flood water comes with high velocity and stays 
for a prolong period. 
Flood protection and roles of different parties 
Developments are at the risk on individuals (households 
or firms). Municipalities may prohibit some socially-
vital activities in these areas, e.g. hospitals. 
Government is responsible to assure safety 
standards prescribed by law. 
Individuals are responsible for their own protection and 
damage in the case of flooding. 
Government refund any possible damage from a 
flood event. 
Flood insurance does not exist but is argued to be 
financially feasible [44]. 
Until recently flood insurance did not exist. 
First contracts to insure flood risks became 
available in 2013 [3]. The issue is debatable 
since some consider it unfeasible [30], [32] 
while others think it is feasible under various 
reinsurance schemes [1]. 
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Figure 3.a: Case-study region (this paper considers only the areas outside the primary 
embankments, see Figure 3b). 
 
 
Figure 3.b: Land use in the Rijnmond-Drecthsteden region (the colored area is the area outside 
the main protection system). Source: [11]. 
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3.2 Modules and data 
An integrated catastrophe management model capable of quantifying optimal location-
specific insurance premiums and coverage comprises several vital components. The 
hazard, exposure and vulnerability modules (I, II and III in Figure 4) provide data inputs 
to estimate potential losses, i.e. damages in each location (Figure 4, IV). Based on the 
estimated damages, the ICRM model runs stochastic optimization under a range of 
constrains across stakeholders (insurance companies, households and firms, government 
ts, etc) to produce optimal risk-based location-specific insurance premiums and 
coverage (Figure 4, V.).  
We describe each module separately when discussing the data inputs into the ICRM 
model.  
 
 
Figure 4: Scheme of modules and data flows.  
 
3.2.1 Hazard module (I) 
The geo-referenced estimates of water depth in the areas outside the main protection 
systems in RD for various return periods floods were estimated using water level 
calculations and flood mapping techniques. The basis elevation data is 5mx5m cell size 
LIDAR data was corrected to include local small embankments and structures [11]. The 
resulting 5m water depths are used in the Deltaprogramme4 and were reviewed by the 
                                                 
4
 Dutch climate adaptation program, http://www.deltacommissaris.nl/english/topics/ 
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Rotterdam Harbour Authority. In this paper we consider spatio-temporal damage 
patterns for “current climate” scenario and three flood scenarios, i.e., 10-, 100-, and 
1000- year floods. 
3.2.2 Exposure data (II) 
Exposure data (II) includes geographically explicit information on different land-uses in 
the case study region, including various geographically referenced data concerning, e.g., 
economy, transportation networks, buildings, population. For the case study region, 
these data have been compiled from HIS-SSM model (Highwater Information System – 
Damage and Casualties Module, [31]). The HIS-SSM is often used to support policy 
decisions reading flood risk management for inside-dike areas in the Netherlands. 
Exposure data include assumptions about economic growth and infrastructure expansion 
in the case study region. The data on land use, roads, railroads and houses has been 
updated compared to earlier HIS-SSM versions [31]. The new data on houses provides 
detailed information on the location of each individual building and its attributes 
(number of houses, elevation etc.) [11].  
3.2.3 Vulnerability module (III) 
Vulnerability curves reflecting damage for a particular land use at a particular water 
level and flood wave speed are the part of HIS-SSM model. Originally designed for the 
inside-dikes areas which are relatively homogeneous with respect to elevation, HIS-
SSM model operates at the scale of 100m ×100m. Since properties in the outside dikes 
areas are often elevated on an individual basis and vary greatly across locations, water-
levels, and consequently damage, are highly location-specific. To be applicable to 
model damages in the outside-dikes areas the resolution of the HIS-SSM calculations 
has been reduced from 100m to 5m cell to get all the obstructions, small levees and 
local height represented well in the water depth and vulnerability maps. 
3.2.4 Loss estimates (IV) 
Location specific damages (losses) for each of the 10-, 100-, 1000- year floods were 
estimated by HIS-SSM combining the data from the “Hazard”,  “Exposure”, and 
“Vulnerability” modules. The damage estimation in HIS-SSM model was adjusted to 
account for the specifics of the outside-dikes areas. Specifically, the damage functions 
and categories for residential buildings have been improved, categories and damage 
figures of agriculture, natural areas and the data on the presence of houses has been 
taken from another more detailed source and damage functions have been adapted. To 
capture the situation in the areas outside main protection system damage figures to 
agricultural and natural areas and construction sites have also been adapted. The 
damage to agricultural and natural areas have been set to zero. This was done since the 
high values for those categories are based on the presence of machinery, stables and 
high yield varieties, which is realistic only in areas with very low flood probabilities. 
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The agricultural areas outside the primary defenses are situated along the rivers and are 
used for cattle breeding in summer. Cattle is removed in winter when peak flows occur, 
what makes damage negligible.  The large natural areas outside the primary defenses 
become deeply flooded twice a day (every high tide) and their ecosystems benefit from 
the floods.  
These improvements in loss estimation resulted in a 60 percent reduction of damages 
compared to the damages estimated in 2011 [11]. In 2013 further improvements will be 
carried out mainly on damage figures, functions and data for companies and industries. 
Yet, these figures should be considered with care as several adjustments, especially to 
1:10 years damage estimations, are likely to come in the next few years. Damage figures 
used in the current paper should be treated as illustrative to show the applicability of the 
ICRM model and its potential practical use.  
 
Table 2: Losses from floods in the RD area 
 Damage, in 2012 euro Expected damage across 
3 flood scenarios 
 Flood 1:10 Flood 1:100 Flood 1:1000 in 2012 euro in % 
Infrastructure 45,195,972 62,531,184 96,080,670 5,117,549 35 
Households 20,248,656 54,404,334 96,487,015 2,577,560 18 
Businesses 51,452,184 154,445,118 309,459,919 6,752,502 47 
Total damage 
(direct and 
indirect) 
116,896,812 271,380,636 502,027,604 14,447,611 100 
Number of 
affected citizens 
1,804 7,354 11,585 --- --- 
 
Damage for the areas outside main protection system were calculated for the three 
return periods: 10-, 100- and 1000-year floods (Table 2). These figures are current best 
estimates for all damage categories across include both direct and indirect damage 
across 27 land use types. Thus, the figures are much higher than for example in [44], 
which estimated damage to houses and house content only. The annual damage per 
residential house excluding any damage to firms and infrastructure in the areas outside 
the main protections system varies from 4-5 euro in Rotterdam and Dordrecht up to 
225-613 euro in Bergambacht and Nederlek for the current climate [44]. 
Figures 5 and 6 display patterns of selected flood damages in outside-dikes areas 
generated by adjusted HIS-SSM for the current climate.  
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Figure 5: Losses, 10-yr. flood Figure 6: Losses, 1000-yr. flood 
 
3.2.5 Modified Stochastic Integrated Catastrophic Risk 
Management Model (ICRM, V.) 
In numerical experiments, the general model (1)–(6) of Section 2 is adjusted to capture 
the spatial resolution and patters of the flood scenarios in the RD region. From the 
model, it is possible to conclude about the optimal FRM insurance policies including 
the composition of insurance arrangement, level of initial fund reserve, the required 
governmental insurance coverage, the demand for other financial instruments 
(contingent credits, cat. bonds, etc.), as it is discussed in numerical experiments.   
We assume that only one “aggregate” insurer or a catastrophe fund operates in the 
region. Similar to Section 2, the main goal of the insurer is to minimize expected 
uncovered losses: 
)()1( ωjj
j
LqE∑ − .         (7) 
The model-derived robust premiums fulfill fairness constraints on non-overpayments by 
individuals and stability of the insurance: 
γωπ <>− }0)({ jjj LqP , for all locations Nj :1= ,     (8) φωπ <<−∑ }0))(({
j
jjj LqP .       (9) 
where jq  is insurance coverage to locations (households) j , jπ  is the level of 
premiums paid by locations/households,  )(ωjL  are stochastic damages to locations 
induced by random floods ω , Ω∈ω , Nj :1= . Constraints (8)-(9) describe stochastic 
supply-demand insurance relations.  
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The problem (7)-(9) may be reformulated as  
  (10)
 
where we convert possibly highly discontinuous equations (8)-(9) into expected 
imbalances defined by convex functions   
})(,0min{ ∑ −
j
jjj LqE π
 
and 
.
 
Similar to (6), first term in (10) denotes expected uncovered losses, the second is 
responsible for minimization of insurance premiums and the third term minimizes the 
expected shortfall of the insurance program on the side of economic agents in each 
location by minimizing their overpayments.  
Adjusting coefficients α  and β  allows to decrease the expected deficits between 
insurance supply and demand. They regulate, in a sense, a tradeoff between the level of 
premiums and the security of the fund. Minimization of function (10) leads to a 
nonsmooth stochastic optimization problem due to max operations. In the model we 
assume that catastrophes, i.e., floods, are represented by scenarios Ss :1= , which 
induce random scenarios of damages sjL  in locations Nj :1= , with  probabilities sp , 
Ss :1= . Using S  scenarios of HIS-SSM, expressions (8) and (9) are replaced by 
empirical expectations: ∑ ∑=  −Ss j jsjjs Lqp1 )(,0min πα , j∀       (11) { }∑= −Ss sjjjs Lqp1 ,0min πβ
     
       (12) 
Linearization of (7), (11) – (12) derives the following optimization problem: ∑ ∑∑∑ ∑ === ++− Ss j sjsSs ssSs sjjjs ppLqp 111 )1(min ζβεα     (13) 
s.t. 
0≥sjζ  
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j
s
jjj Lq ζπ ≤−
 
,  
,  
,  
for all scenarios of flood events  in all locations  , . This approach 
converts non-smooth stochastic optimization under discontinuous constraints into a 
simple linear optimization problem. There may be considerable uncertainties associated 
with damage scenarios and flood probabilities, which in the model may be captured by 
varying probabilities , 
. For example, it is possible to specify uncertainty 
bounds for flood return periods, i.e.,   
.
 
4 Numerical experiments: selected results 
4.1 Spatial patterns of robust model-derived premiums 
In the RD case study region, the robust model-derived (according to (7)-(9)) premiums 
are computed at the aggregated resolution of 100 by 100 m2, which approximately 
corresponds to a block of 16- 25 residential houses.  The resolution may be tuned to 
represent specifics of some areas, e.g., a residential house, a shopping moll, 
concentrated infrastructure, intensive transportation node. Figure 8 shows spatial 
distribution of premiums in the case study region aggregated to a neighborhood level 
and Figure 9 displays premiums as percent of the damages in the 100-year flood.  
One may see that while the area is relatively small, there is a big spatial variation among 
the robust premiums. This implies that robust ICRM-derived premiums capture 
location-specific risk heterogeneities and, thus, guarantee the stability of the insurance 
program under conditions that all stakeholders (government, insurance company and 
households and firms) cover some share of flood risk. For insurance practitioners, the 
spatial heterogeneity of the premiums highlights the importance of estimating spatially 
resolved policies. In the majority of neighborhoods, annual insurance premiums average 
per location (100mx100m cell) do not exceed 5.000 euro for infrastructure, businesses 
and households. This makes 130-200 euro per property per year excluding premiums for 
infrastructure. Few neighborhoods, where insurance premiums go up to 50.000-100.000 
euro per annum per location, are characterized by high concentration of infrastructure 
and businesses. Businesses may suffer much larger damages compared to households 
since in addition to the direct property damage they also incur indirect damage from 
business interruption.  
0≥sε
Ss :1= j Nj :1=
sp Ss :1=
Ss :1= sss ppp ≤≤
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Figure 8: Total sum of robust annual premiums, aggregated per neighborhood (buurt). Number 
denote the number of affected locations in each particular neighborhood (results have 
illustrative purpose).  
 
 
Figure 9: Premiums as percent of the damages in the 100-year flood, aggregated per 
neighborhood (buurt). Results have illustrative purpose. 
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Alternative policy options for the choice of premiums can be suggested by stakeholders 
(i.e., insurers, local governments, individuals). In what follows we discuss with more 
detail the specifics of robust quantile-based premiums derived by minimization of (7) 
subject to (8)-(9) and summarize their advantages compared to the AAL premiums. In 
the outlined numerical experiments we consider the following two rules for calculation 
of premiums: 
1. Quantile-based robust premiums that fairly equalize the risk of instability for the 
insurance company and the risk of premiums overpayments for exposed 
individuals (locations);  
2. Location-specific premiums based on AAL in a particular location, i.e., actuarial 
risk-based premiums. 
 
Figure 10.a:  Figure 10.b: 
Flood damages for 3 return periods:  D10, D100, D1000  correspond to damages due to 10-, 
100-, and 1000- year floods, respectively; and two alternative premium options (per annum) – 
AAL and Robust (results have illustrative purpose). 
 
Figures 10.a and 10.b show that the robust model-derived premiums are lower than 
AAL premiums. Thus, the robust premiums not only guarantee financial stability of the 
insurance program, which involves loss sharing between governments, insurers, and 
economic agents (households and firms) in flood-prone areas. Quantile-based premiums 
also reduce insurance prices, what in turn increases attractiveness of the program for 
economic agents boosting demand for insurance and its take up rates.  
Most of the results here are presented on the aggregated level of a neighborhood since 
the resolution of premium estimate is high while extent of the geographical area of 
estimation is quite wide. Yet, the ICRM model allows to zoom in and analyze damages, 
AAL and quantile-based robust premiums for each individual location, i.e. 100m×100m 
cell. As demonstrated in Figure 11, the spatial differentiation is not only obvious across 
neighborhoods but also between individual locations. Location to the right exhibits a 
 21 
gradual increase in damages and corresponding insurance premiums (AAL and quantile-
based) when moving from 2000 to 2050 and 2100 climate scenario. Location to the left 
is characterized by more abrupt jumps in damages and corresponding premiums. Note, 
that for the right location AAL is closer to the robust premium (35 percent difference, 
current climate estimates) than for the left one (54 percent of difference). 
 
 
Figure 11: Spatial differences between two representative locations in the case study region: 
D10, D100, D1000 - flood damages for 10, 100, 1000 year floods; AAL – average annualized 
premiums based on the average annual damage across 3 flood scenarios; Robust – quantile-
based model-derived premiums (results have illustrative purpose).  
 
4.2 Analysis of Optimal Insurance Program per Stakeholder 
4.2.1 Analysis of the insurance program financial 
stability from the insurer side  
By varying coefficients ,  it is possible to derive premiums ensuring required 
solvency for the insurer and desired level of non-overpayments for individuals. Figures 
12.a and 12.b present histograms of the indicator  estimating the 
balance between premiums paid into and compensations paid out of the insurance fund, 
for robust and AAL premiums, respectively. Negative values on the horizontal axis 
identify when compensations exceed premiums, and the vertical axis shows the number 
of locations. In AAL case (Figure 12.b), compensations are almost always higher than 
premiums. In Figure 12.a, for robust premiums, the balance is achieved for about 4000 
locations (0 on the horizontal axis), while in Figure 12.b, for AAL, only about 1500 
locations are in balance.  
α β
)(1
,
s
jjjssj LqpI −= π
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Figure 12.a: Non-overcompensations by 
insurance companies under robust model-
derived premiums  
Figure 12.b: Non- overcompensations by 
insurance companies under annualized 
premiums based on average damage 
 
Overcompensations increase financial risk to the insurer. Figure 13.a displays a 
histogram of the indicator , defining insurer’s balance between 
premiums and coverages, , for scenarios  (i.e., 10-, 100-, and 1000-year 
floods), respectively. Positive values on the vertical axis mean shortage of the capital. 
With robust premiums, the insurer has no problems compensating damages from 10-
year flood. He experiences only small deficit of the capital reserve in the case of 100-
year flood, imbalance between premiums and coverage is about 350.000 euro. In 1000- 
year flood scenario the insurer may become a bankrupt if he is obliged to fully 
compensate the damages. In this scenario, capital deficit is about 4,8 mln. euro. In 
contrast, despite being determined based on the location-specific actual risk (expected 
average damage), the AAL-based insurance premiums bring the financial stability of the 
insurance program under questions starting already with less severe 10-year flood. As 
demonstrated in Figure 2, the annualization of the expected damage omits the facts that 
coverages need to be paid off instantly at the moment of hazard’s occurrence, which in 
this case causes a shortfall in insurer’s fund between 23 mln (for , Figure 13.b) 
and 25mln euro (for , Figure 13.a) for the 10-year flood scenario. Under the 
insurance program with robust premiums the financial situation of the insurer is 
undermined only by 1000-year event, while in the case of AAL-based premiums he is 
continuously running out of capital (capital deficit).  
Insurer’s bankruptcy may be avoided completely by adjusting insurer’s risk coefficient 
. For example, Figure 13 shows financial situation of the insurer if  is changed 
from 1 to 100. With robust premiums in case of 10-year flood, the insurer accumulates 
capital surplus of about 200.000 euro indicated by the negative value in Figure 13.b 
(marked with “10-yr” on the horizontal axis). The insurer’s reserve is still positive in 
∑ −=
j
s
jjjss LqpI )(2 π
1=α 3,2,1=s
100=α
1=α
α α
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case of 100-year event, and only 1000- year event leads to about 1,25 mln euro capital 
deficit.   
  
Figure 13: Insurer’s balance between premiums and coverages: for Robust and AAL premiums, 
13.a:     13.b:  
 
 
4.2.2 Analysis of the insurance program financial stability 
from households and firms side 
Changing α  from 1 to 100 increases premiums and changes the profile of the indicator 
1
,sjI as in Figure 14a,b. In particular, Figure 14b shows that robust premiums derived 
with 100=α
 
almost  fairly balance out the overpayments and underpayments of 
individuals, i.e., the number of negative and positive values of 1
,sjI  is approximately the 
same. Further increase of  would lead to complete safety of the insurer, e.g., no 
capital deficit even in the most severe 1000- year catastrophe, however for the cost of 
higher premiums, which may reduce insurance demand.  
 
1=α 100=α
α
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Figure 14: Non-overpayments by economic agents (firms and households) 
14.a: robust premiums,
 
1=α .                                     14.b: robust premiums,
 
100=α . 
 
4.2.3 Analysis of the insurance program stability from the 
government perspective 
Apart from premiums, the model provides insights regarding initial risk reserve, 
necessary amount of reinsurance or governmental compensation, or other financial 
instruments such as contingent credit or bond. By varying risk coefficients  and   it 
is possible to analyze optimal combination of different financial instruments and study 
their role in flood insurance system. Botzen and van den Bergh (2008) provide 
arguments in favor of a public-private “three-pillar” flood insurance system in the 
Netherlands. Similar type of public-private-civil partnerships have already been studied 
in US [33], Italy, Hungary [20], etc. 
In the three-layered system, the first layer may assume the government, which would 
provide compensation of a limited amount to all households that suffer losses from 
flooding. As the second layer, a private insurance (or local mutual catastrophe fund) 
may be established by pooling risks through flood insurance on the basis of location-
specific risk exposures. As the third layer, a contingent credit may become available to 
provide an additional injection of capital to stabilize the system.  
For the analysis of the three-pillar system, the goal function (7) may be formally 
modified as follows: minimize  
)()()1( ωνω j
j
jj
j
LELqE ∑∑ +−        (14) 
under constraints (8)-(9), where  is a level of governmental compensation, 1≤+νjq , 
. The evaluation of optimal robust governmental share ν  requires explicit 
introduction of the governmental (catastrophe) budget and its insolvency constraint 
α β
ν
Nj ,1=
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similar to (8)-(9). The size of this budget is itself a key decision variable, which calls for 
essential modifications of the model and is not considered in these studies. In fact, the 
choice of ν  may substantially depend on stake holders opinion and therefore be defined 
exogenous as in these illustrative experiments where we assume 0=ν . The sensitivity 
analysis with respect to varying ν  is rather straightforward and is not the subject of the 
current discussion.  
The demand for contingent credit is defined by the indicator   
reflecting capital deficit of the insurer. Thus, in Figure 13a,b, with , the demand 
for contingent credit is shaped by positive values of the , i.e., the histogram of 
insurer’s shortfall. It is possible to reshape the risk of the insurer by altering the 
assumption about risk coefficients  and 
 
and the level of governmental support . 
5 Conclusions 
This paper discusses the importance of properly designed financial arrangements for 
sharing flood losses while comparing insurance premiums estimated based on average 
annual damage vs. quantile-based premiums. We presented an illustrative example of 
robust insurance program for a case study region close to Rotterdam in the Netherlands. 
We consider a loss-sharing program based on pooling flood risks through private flood 
insurance, partial compensation to the flood victims by the central government, and a 
contingent credit to the insurance for “buffering” the risk. The success of this program 
depends on the mutual stability of the involved stakeholders. For the analysis of the 
stability, we use the ICRM approach allowing to derive robust insurance policies, e.g., 
premiums and coverage of the insurer, governmental support, involvement of 
individuals, accounting for complex interplay between multivariate spatially and 
temporally explicit probability distributions of flood losses and risk exposures of the 
stakeholders. A robust policy satisfies two goals: (i) to fulfill goals and constraints of 
the involved stakeholders, and (ii) to guarantee program’s solvency under all (or a 
percentile) flood scenarios rather than one (average) event 
In the case study region, the ICRM is comprised of a geographically-detailed updated 
HIS-SSM model and of a spatially-explicit quantile-based multi-agent multi-criteria 
stochastic optimization (STO) procedure integrated as follows: (1) water depth levels 
are processed in HIS-SSM to calculate flood damages for 10-, 100-, and 1000- year 
floods; (2) STO estimates robust policies fulfilling the safety requirement of the 
program.  
With numerical experiments, we compare two alternative ways of calculating insurance 
premiums: the robust derived with ICRM and the AAL approaches. In case of 
catastrophic flood losses, which occur as “spikes” in time and space, the AAL approach 
∑ −=
j
s
jjjss LqpI )(2 π
0=ν
2
sI
α β ν
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does not guarantee proper balance between premiums and claims, and the insurer 
experiences deficit of the capital to cover the losses. With robust premiums, the insurer 
is better off.  
We argue that because of significant interdependencies among catastrophe losses across 
different locations, the demand for a particular financial instrument cannot be separated 
from the demand for other risk transfer and risk reduction measures. In particular, our 
numerical experiments show that robust location-specific premiums of the insurance 
decrease the demand for contingent credit, as discussed in Section 4.2.3. Section 4.2.2 
explains how ICRM allows tuning of robust premiums towards the required trade-off 
between the level of insurer solvency and the overpayments by the individuals, thus 
increasing popularity of the insurance and its take up rates. One of the future directions 
for the ICRM approach would be to consider a coupled choice of financial loss sharing 
measures among stakeholders and structural flood mitigation measures, such as zoning 
of certain land use functions, elevation of an area or particular buildings, wet and dry 
floodproofing [12]. 
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